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Participation in the governance structures of the EU adds an additional layer to domestic systems of policy making, alters the opportunity structure for national actors and carries with it pressures for domestic adaptation. All member states must learn to live with the Union. The dense institutional fabric of the EU and the intensity of policy integration embeds the member states in distinctive processes of transnational policy making. The boundary between the domestic and the international is blurred for political actors and governmental institutions. Adaptation to membership and engagement with EU collective governance requires more than a once off adjustment. The demands of collective governance are continuous and unpredictable given the fluid and open character of the Union’s agenda and the evolving nature of the EU as a polity. Moreover, in addition to sector specific demands, the member states pay attention to the constitutive features of the system and track formal and informal changes to processes, procedures and institutional balances. National governments do their homework for individual negotiations, position their state in the Union and develop a policy on the future development of the EU. This implies an ability to scan their environment, to develop and maintain critical relationships with EU institutions and their partners in the Union. Engagement in collective governance does not mean a downgrading of national governments. Rather ‘representing national interests and contributing to shaping the development of the EC requires more, rather than less of national governments’ (Metcalfe 1993, 2). National executives exercise a pivotal linking role in the Union’s system of collective governance. 

The research presented in this paper explores the Europeanisation of executive government in three member states.1 The objectives of the paper are to (1) provide authoritative accounts of the impact of the EU on executive government, (2) to identify patterns of adaptation to engagement with the Union, (3) to track change over time, (4) to identify the variables that enable us to explain and characterise the pattern of adaptation and (5) we ask if domestic variation and capacity matter. The discussion is divided into six sections. Section one explores the literature on Europeanisation and executive adaptation. This is followed by three sections on the structures and roles associated with managing Europe, the processes that have evolved and the officials or agents who are responsible for mediating between the national and the European. 

The Literature on Executive Adaptation

During the 1990s, a growing body of research evolved on the theme of Europeanisation, a term deployed to connote the impact of the EU on the domestic.2 The focus on the domestic impact of the EU was a reaction to the excessive concentration in the literature on processes of institution building at EU level. As the Union developed and deepened, the effects of Europeanisation were increasingly experienced in the domains of national policies, politics and more broadly in the domestic polities of the member states and candidate countries. Olsen identified five faces of Europeanisation, one of which is explored in this paper, namely, the adaptation of ‘national and sub-national systems of governance to a European political centre and European-wide norms’ 3(Olsen, 2002). One of the earliest definitions of Europeanisation defined it as an ‘incremental process re-orientating the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national politics and policy making’ (Ladrech 1994, 69). This definition points to a process of internalisation or top-down pressure whereby the EU gradually permeates domestic processes and triggers adaptation at national level. The member states are not, however, passive recipients of EU policies and programmes. They actively participate in shaping outcomes in Brussels and mediate what comes from the EU through national political and administrative institutions and processes. Managing Europe from home is a key concern for all member states. Moreover, the processes associated with Europeanisation are not limited to the member states but embrace states that have strong ties of association with the EU, particularly the candidate states that are in pre-accession mode.  

National executives remain the key ‘translator devices’ between the European and the domestic (Genschel, 2001, 98). They are at the nodal point between the national and the European, with a role in projecting the preferences of the member states in the Brussels arena (up-loading) and in acting as the conduit for the reception of EU laws, programmes and policies into the domestic (down-loading). Authoritative accounts of how national executives manage Europe contributes to the broader understanding of processes of Europeanisation. This paper does not begin from a perspective of ‘goodness of fit’, one of the dominant approaches in the Europeanisation literature. ‘Goodness of fit’ is frequently used in studies of Europeanisation as the starting point of analysis (Börzel and Risse, 2000,  Héritier et al, 2001). The key argument is that if there is a mis-match between the demands of European policies and domestic arrangements, adaptation pressures on domestic institutions and administrative structures will emerge. The starting point of this analysis is that the executives in member states and would be member states must evolve structures and processes for managing Brussels because the EU is an additional arena of public policy making that must be serviced. 

The substantive focus of the literature on the impact of the EU on executive government has been on the formal organisational changes that membership has brought and the manner in which national governments respond to engagement with the Union.4 Underlying most of the comparative studies is the question of convergence or continuing divergence in national responses. Two OECD studies in the late 1990s suggested that a European Administrative Space and a Europeanised system of administrative law was emerging in the EU (OECD, 1998; Cardona, 1999).  These findings have been challenged in other studies (Demmke 2002; Olsen 2003). The dominant conclusion found in the existing literature on executive adaptation points to the continuing diversity of domestic responses to EU engagement. Harmsen concluded his comparative analysis of France and the Netherlands as follows:

There is little evidence of the Europeanization of national administrations in the sense of convergence towards a common institutional model. National administrations are not coming to resemble one another, nor are they coming to resemble a sort of synthetic EU prototype. The administrations of the member states have, for the most part, retained their distinctive structures and operating procedures (Harmsen 1999, 81-62)

Page and Wouters concur with this when arguing that ‘there is no strong reason to believe that this Europeanization necessarily brings with it any substantial change in the national administrative structure of member states (Page and Wouters 1995). This claim is further supported by the Bulmer and Burch study on the adaptation of UK central government to EU membership, which concluded that ‘at the level of machinery, governmental structures and procedure, the impact of Europe has been far less evident’ (Bulmer and Burch 1998, 624). Although continuing diversity is the dominant finding, there are studies that point to ‘a mixed pattern of similarity and difference’ in the organisation of member state representations in Brussels (Kassim et al 2001, 235). What is missing in most of the studies to date is identification of the variables that impact on the character of domestic adaptation. There is also limited work on the individual cadre, the officials, who operate as boundary managers or boundary spanners between the national and the European (Williams 2002, 103-123).

The Focus of the Paper

This paper analyses how central governments in three small states Ireland, Greece and Finland handle their engagement with the EU. The emphasis on small states was to provide a counterbalance to the extensive literature on large state adaptation in the Union.5 All three states joined the EU after its initial formative period and all with the exception of Finland, had per capita incomes well below the EU average. For Ireland and Greece engagement with the EU was bound up with national projects of economic development and modernisation and for Finland it marked a decisive shift in the post war alliances of that small state bordering on the Soviet Union. The paper adopts the core executive as the primary unit of analysis. In the 1990s, there was a renewed emphasis on research into the dynamics of core executive government and the manner in which executives were responding to the challenges of contemporary governance (Peters et al 2000, Rhodes ed., 2000, vols 1 and 2). In all treatments of executive government in Europe, the transfer of policy competence to the EU and the participation of national actors in EU policy-making is identified as a major theme (Rhodes 2000, Wright and Hayward, 2000). The standard definition of the core executive in the literature is:

All those organisations and structures which primarily serve to pull together and integrate central government policies, or act as final arbiters within the executive of conflicts between different elements of the government machine (Dunleavy and Rhodes, 1990: 4)

This definition is overly structural and organisational. The core executive is more than a set of organisations and structures because of the centrality of political-governmental roles, notably, the prime minister, ministers and ministerial advisors and administrative roles, senior officials to its operation. The core executive lies at the interface between the political and administrative arenas involving a ‘highly institutionalised set of relationships’ (Smith, 2000, 29). These relationships are mediated by constitutional provisions, processes of government formation and the organisation of central government. For the purposes of the paper, the core executive was defined as all those organisations, structures and roles that served to integrate the work of governments in relation to Europe. 
The theoretical and methodological approach adopted in the paper is institutionalist, an approach that dominates research on national adaptation to EU engagement given the focus on organisational and process adaptation4 (Harmsen, 1999, Bulmer and Burch, 2001, Kassim et al 2001). The paper draws on a combination of historical institutionalism, on the one hand, and what Peters categorizes as empirical institutionalism, on the other (Peters, 1999). Two features of historical institutionalism are important. First, studies adopting a historical institutionalist perspective tend to focus on ‘organizational and institutional configurations’ rather than on a single organisational site (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, 693). The focus in this paper is on the ecology of institutions, roles and processes associated with managing European business rather than one organisation.   Second, historical institutionalism pays attention to institutional development and processes of change over time. Taking institutional evolution seriously required us to go beyond a snapshot to tracking change over time (Bulmer and Burch, 2001). This enables us to distinguish between endogenous and exogenous sources of change, the significance of path dependency and the importance of critical junctures in domestic adaptation. In order to map the emerging institutional configuration and the pattern of adaptation, the methodology consisted of ‘soaking and poking’ on the basis of a set of agreed dimensions across the three case studies (King, Keohane and Verba 1994, 38). Using analytical induction, the objective was to map and explain the pattern of national adaptation through time over a number of inter-related dimensions. 





The Europeanisation of national executives is uneven across ministries as the reach and depth of European public policy differs from one policy sector to another. Based on the empirical findings in the national case studies following the initial mapping of the core executive, a distinction emerged between the:
	The Central Co-ordinators  (the heart of the system);
	Inner-core;
	Outer circle.
The co-ordinators consist of a number of designated governmental roles and supporting organisations with constitutional, political and administrative responsibilities relating to the management of domestic government and the co-ordination of public policy making on Europe. In all states, the co-ordinators consisted of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, the Foreign Ministry, European ministers if they existed, the permanent representations and missions in Brussels, and new offices and committees established to manage EU matters. The Finnish President was also designated as part of the core because of his/her responsibilities for Finnish foreign policy. In addition, the Ministry for Finance and/or National Economy was part of the co-ordinating core because of their structural position at domestic level and the growing role of the Eco-Fin Council (Finance and Economics Ministers) in the EU system. 

Within the heart of the national systems, a distinction was evident in the study between prime-ministerial led systems, on the one hand, and Foreign Ministry led systems, on the other. In Finland, the management of EU business was led by an office located in the prime ministers’ office whereas in Ireland and Greece, the Foreign Ministry had amassed and maintained the key responsibilities and resources.7. See Table 1. 

Table 1: Core Management of EU affairs

PM Led	Foreign Ministry Led
Finland (2000)Government Secretariat for EU Affairs	IrelandEuropean Union Division
	GreeceGeneral Secretariat for European Affairs

Finland created a new office to manage EU business after an initial period when the Foreign Ministry had primary responsibility for European affairs. In the period leading up to Finnish membership in 1995 and for the first five years of membership, responsibility for EU matters remained with the Foreign Ministry but were moved to the Prime Minister’s Office with the creation of the Government Secretariat for EU Affairs with a staff of 20 officials under the auspices of a Secretary of State for EU affairs. This was part of a deeper strengthening of the Prime Minister’s role in Finland as the political reach of the Finnish President was progressively narrowed. The decision to locate responsibility in the PM’s office signalled an internalisation or domestication of EU affairs and was designed to underpin the growing role of the prime minister in the Finnish political system. In Ireland and Greece, following an initial period of inter-ministerial rivalry between the Foreign Ministry and the Finance/Economics ministry, the former emerged with responsibility for day to day management of European affairs. 

Regardless of institutional structures, the relationship between the prime minister, foreign minister and European minister, if the latter exists, and between their respective ministries appears crucial to the domestic management of EU affairs and to the projection of national preferences in the European arena. They are indispensable partners in the management of European affairs. These roles and related ministries and offices combine an over-arching view of the EU and the domestic system. Even in countries with Foreign Ministry led systems, the role of the Prime Minister in European affairs has increased. Foreign Ministries and PM’s offices must work together to project the member state in the EU system. The relationship between those holding the offices and their supporting ministries is usually complementary but tensions can and do arise. Foreign ministries are conditioned to translate the demands and constraints of the European system into the national systems whereas the focus of the Prime Minister’s office is more domestic. Prime Ministers’ offices are better placed than foreign ministries to mediate with powerful domestic ministries. That said, both Foreign Ministries and Prime Minister’s Offices want to play the political game in Brussels and to limit conflict and controversy between the national and the European.The role and authority of the office allows the Prime Minister or office to intervene at any stage in EU matters. The manner in which a particular Prime Minister exercises his/her role on Europe depends on constitutional provisions, government formation, the role of the Prime Minister’s office, longevity in office and the personal preferences of the office holder. Selective activism is the most apposite description of Prime Ministerial engagement with Europe because Europe is only one of many items on their agenda. 

The national case studies highlight the growing role of the PM in all states but the character of prime ministerial engagement differs from one country to another. The prime minister is a ‘primus solus’ in the Greek system, a fact that is strengthened by single party governments since 1974. During the formative years of Greek membership, Andreas Papandreou (PM 1981-89 and 1993-95) adopted a highly centralised and personalised political style. Executive institutions, notably the Cabinet and its sub-committees did not function on a systematic or regular basis. The Greek national report concluded that:

The inactivity or lack of institutional, collective decision-making, though an ever present characteristic of Greek political-administrative system, became the striking feature of the Papandreou governments of the 1980s. The cabinet seldom met and decisions would be taken by the prime minister and his close collaborators and then presented to the other members of the cabinet (Spanou and Andreou, 2002, p. 33)

When Prime Minister Simitis came to power in 1995, he favoured a decentralised political style and encouraged the systemic operation of the Government’s collegiate organs such as the cabinet and sub-committees. The most important contribution made by Prime Minister Simitis was to create a pro-European political framework for the Greek system to work within. His prioritisation of European issues, although clear, was not reflected in new institutional mechanisms. The role of the Finnish and Irish Prime Ministers are governed by domestic systems that are more institutionalised and formal. Constitutional change, which began in Finland in the 1980s, gradually transformed the Finnish system from a semi-presidential to a semi-prime ministerial one. Power was gradually transferred from the Presidency to the Prime Minister. The new constitution and the transfer of EU responsibility to the Prime Minister’s Office endowed the Prime Minister’s Office with a central role in European policy making. This was enhanced by the multi-party character of Finnish Governments and the multiple assignment of ministers to different ministries. In 2002, the Foreign ministry had 4.5 ministers attached to it, all with equal status. The Irish Prime Minister is a ‘primus inter pares’ in a well established and institutionalised cabinet system. As leader of the Government, the Prime Minister plays an important role in all of the major issues. The position of leader of the largest party and executive dominance over parliament endows the Prime Minister with considerable political authority. 
locus of EU expertise. 





The nature of European governance necessitates the creation of inter-ministerial structures to manage cross-cutting issues and to act as a counterbalance to the fragmentation of domestic public policy making arising from the network character of the Union. Horizontal inter-ministerial structures including cabinet sub-committees, high level inter-ministerial committees of senior officials, the permanent representations in Brussels and committees dealing with a broad range of cross- sectoral issues have emerged in all states, apart from Greece. Inter-ministerial structures are highly formalised in Finland. A set of designated structures that reaches from the apex of the system at political level to the operating core of the ministries has evolved. The aim is to ensure that all European issues are comprehensively dealt with at the appropriate level of the hierarchy and with the involvement of the national parliament and civil society. The Irish system was much more weakly institutionalised in its formative period but became more formalised in the latter half of the 1990s and especially following the defeat of the Nice referendum in 2001. A stable inter-ministerial system that cascades down from the Cabinet was institutionalised. There are however far fewer inter-ministerial groups in Ireland (4) than in Finland (40) and they meet with less regularity. The Finnish system works to a weekly rhythm whereas the Irish system works to a monthly timetable. Greece has the most weakly institutionalised horizontal system among the member states. An informal inter-ministerial committee under the auspices of the Foreign Ministry meets informally once a month but there is no corresponding ministerial committee or policy groups. 
See Table 2.

Table 2: Summary of Structures for Managing EU Affairs

	IRL.	Greece	Finland
PM OfficeSpecial EU Secretariat/Office	No	No	Yes
PM Office Special EU/International Unit	Yes	No	No
EU Cabinet Sub-Committee	Yes	No	Yes




The Missions in Brussels

Managing Europe from home involves the permanent representations or EU missions in Brussels. The representations and missions, as a microcosm of the national administrations, play a central role. The three member state representations bring the domestic style of managing European affairs to Brussels. They differ in terms of their size, staffing, internal functioning and overall role in the national management of EU affairs. In 2000, Greece had the largest representation of the three states with 60 staff at diplomatic level, followed by Finland with 54 and Ireland with 35 (Vachers 2000). The size of the Greek and Finnish representations is partly due to distance from Brussels but also reflects the attributes of the domestic system. The Greek representation is very hierarchical and centralised whereas the other two representations are much more collegiate in style. The Finnish representation is infused with the norm of representing the Finnish position and not just the positions of the ministries. This was also true of the Irish case although strong loyalties remain to the domestic ministries. The Greek representation, in contrast, was characterised by inter-ministerial competition, between the horizontal ministries (Foreign Ministry and Ministry of the National Economy) and the sectoral ministries, on the one hand, and between the two horizontal ministries themselves. Competition, rivalry, and mutual suspicion characterised inter-ministerial relations.




The key structures, the ministries, the Cabinet and committees serve to channel work on Europe in the national administrations. The tempo of work on European issues is driven by the EU calendar and the collective agenda. Domestic processes are designed to cope with the different phases of the negotiating process. The domestic processes identified in the case studies are governed by a mixture of formal rules and guidelines and informal conventions that have evolved over time. Of the three member states, Finland had the most elaborate set of rules and guidelines for the management of EU matters. The preparation of EU business was defined in section 93(2) of the Constitution and supplemented by Government standing orders. The EU Secretariat in the Prime Minister’s Office has formal responsibility for the preparation of procedural rules and guidelines for handling EU matters and does so on a periodic basis. The use of rules, codes and guidelines in Ireland is less systematic but has gradually increased. The submission on EU related business to Cabinet is governed by Cabinet rules and there is a Foreign Ministry circular about how EU matters should be handled dating from September 1973. The development of new guidelines on parliamentary scrutiny in 2002 was the most significant formalisation of EU business in the history of Ireland’s engagement with the EU. Greece combines a highly legalistic administrative culture with a dominance of informal channels and norms. In Greece formal rules and guidelines do not appear to exist, at least in any systematic way. The EU management system operates in a decentralised even fragmented manner around minimal obligations for information and coordination. 
National policy styles differ in terms of their ambition and ability to coordinate and manage the interaction with Brussels. Co-ordination is perceived by scholars and practitioners alike as important to effective involvement in Brussels (Kassim et al, 2001). A report on the Dutch system of EU coordination cited the need for the management of horizontal and vertical interdependence, close co-operation between those working on national and European policies, ‘speaking with one voice’, and ‘getting in early’ in the negotiations, ensuring consistency, exchanging information and working within defined priorities and accepted policy principles (Schout, 1999). This view of coordination was an ambitious and demanding one with its focus on coherence, consistency and clear priorities. The challenge for all states was to find an effective balance between sectoral autonomy and an overall strategy/prioritisation. Not all issues on the EU agenda demand the highest levels of coordination, and heavy-handed co-ordination at national level may militate against effectiveness in the Brussels arena. 
The need for coordination depends on the nature of the issue on the Brussels agenda. A four-fold distinction between routine policy making, cross-sectoral issues, major policy shaping negotiations and the ‘big bargains’ is apposite. Ministries manage the routine sectoral issues without need for consultation and co-ordination. Coordination is required for issues such as state aids, environment and competition policy that cross ministerial boundaries. The major policy shaping decisions that influence the trajectory of a particular policy domain also require an inter-ministerial perspective as they may have a bearing on other areas of policy. Finally the big bargains such as treaty change or enlargement require inter-ministerial discussion and coordination. Managing the flow of EU negotiations is not just about a series of discrete policy decisions but involves making linkages and establishing priorities across different fields. Coordination of European affairs demands an ability to coordinate issues as well as the Union’s policy cycle with its continuous flow of meetings. Coordination of European issues is linked to prioritisation. Given the limits of size and political capital in the Union, small states tend to prioritise. All small states devote considerable attention to those areas that are seen as a priority in domestic terms, but differ in the extent to which they are able to contribute to policy shaping beyond their core interests.  






Table 3: Co-ordination Styles







Managing EU engagement has become an important specialism within national diplomatic services and in the home civil services. In order to live with the Brussels system, states need a cadre of EU specialists who can combine technical/sectoral expertise with European experience (Bulmer and Burch, 2000). European experience and ability rests on deep knowledge of how the EU system works, its legal foundations and rules, and the personal skills to work in the multi-national and multi-lingual EU environment.  The EU cadre work as boundary managers between the national and the European. They can be found in the coordinating ministries and in the inner core of ministries that have intensive dealings with the EU. The majority of them work at the operating level, i.e. those who attend working parties, but the cadre also included a number of key officials at the apex of the ministries. The cadre gained their initial EU experience at working party level and may later find themselves at more senior levels with substantial European responsibilities. The most experienced of them spend time in the Representation, or in one of the institutions. Extensive exposure to Brussels brought the added bonus of contacts with counterparts in other member states. The EU cadre was small in number. In the Irish case for example, an internal report estimated that only 12% of the total pool of Irish civil servants had significant EU involvement in 1980. A follow-up report in 2002 found that there were only three ministries, Foreign Affairs, Industry, Trade and Employment and Agriculture that had over 50 staff working on EU matters for over 50% of their time. In many ministries, the number was five or less (Laffan and O’Mahony 2002, 92). There was an intimacy among the cadre of the smaller states not found in the larger member states.

Among the three member state there were striking differences concerning the composition of the cadre and the level of responsibility accorded to the operating core the ministries. In Ireland and Finland, the desk official or middle level civil servant had a major say on the elaboration of the Irish or Finnish position. Civil servants in both systems operated within a homogenous administrative culture. The Finnish civil servant worked within the institutionalised system of coordination (the sections) whereas the Irish civil servant engaged in consultation and coordination on a needs basis. Both systems tried to solve difficult issues at the lowest level of the hierarchy. Dossiers were only sent up to the political level if there were major resource or policy issues at stake. Sensitive political issues were processed at the highest levels in the hierarchy. In contrast, a striking characteristic of the Greek cadre was the reliance on non-civil servants, i.e. political appointees, in key positions in the system. The resort to non-civil servants was institutionalised in the Council of Economic Experts (SOE) in 1987. The SOE played a central role in economic governance and was highly regarded within the Greek system. One interviewee concluded that ‘ the idea of the Council of Economic Experts, e.g. High quality staff from the market (not from the civil service) is good and needs to be supported’ (Spanou and Andreou, 2002). Civil servants saw this as a successful way of dealing with insufficient expertise within the administrative system. The expertise of the mainstream civil service remained weak.  The lack of competence in many sectoral areas meant that issues are driven up the administrative and political hierarchy for resolution. 

Core-Executive Parliament Relations
There is a varied pattern of executive-parliament relations in the study. The role of parliament is highly institutionalised and integrated in Finland. The role of the parliament is anchored in the constitution and involves ex ante and ex post scrutiny. The mandate from the parliament is not binding unlike Denmark and Austria but carries considerable political weight. The Irish parliament had traditionally a rather weak role in the supervision of the core executive in Europe but this changed in the aftermath of the Nice I referendum in June 2001. In 2002 the Government introduced new procedures that are designed to enhance the role of the Irish parliament in EU affairs. The Greek parliament is the weakest of the three parliaments. It only established an EU committee in 1990, some 9 years after accession. Strong single party government since 1974 have ensured that the executive dominates the parliament. However, the parliament itself does not use the opportunities that are available to it and is not part of a comprehensive approach to the management of EU matters for the system as a whole. The Committee for EU Affairs has low visibility and operates in a consensual mode. 

Europeanisation, Variation and the Dynamic of Change

Domestic core executives have internalised the demands of engagement with the European Union. All three states display an ability to adapt and adjust domestic structures and processes to the demands of engagement with the EU. The adaptation pressures generated by the need to service EU policy making appears low or moderate. There is evidence of both convergence across the three states and continuing diversity.  There is convergence of structural mechanisms for dealing with Europe, notably EU units, high level inter-ministerial committees, and sectoral policy groups but continuing diversity in terms of the underlying national styles of managing internationalisation. All states, apart from Greece, institutionalised cabinet sub-committees, inter-ministerial high-level groupings and policy committees. The Brussels based representation is a central node in domestic management of EU affairs in all states. Furthermore the three states established parliamentary committees dealing with Europe. Convergence of structures has not led to a convergence of national styles and processes for managing European affairs. There are significant differences concerning the politico-administrative interface, the number of officials assigned to managing the EU/national interface, the role of individual civil servants, the range and membership of cross-sectoral policy committees, the regularity of meetings and the engagement of national parliaments and societal groups in moulding domestic policy. It is thus apposite to draw a distinction between the instrumentalities for managing the EU-domestic interface where we see convergence and the underlying political and administrative core of the national systems that are characterised by continuing divergence (Knill, 2001, 35-57). 

Notwithstanding the country specific nature of the structures and processes identified in the three states, two variables stand out in explaining variation. These are:
	the degree of institutionalisation;
	the relationship between the formal and informal processes.
Institutionalisation is a multifaceted concept that implies structuration, routinisation, the development of standard operating procedures and shared codes of meaning (Olsen 2000, 4-5). The degree of structuration and routinisation of EU business differs markedly across the member states. Some states have highly institutionalised and regularised systems for managing EU business whereas other systems are weakly institutionalised and less stable. A high degree of institutionalisation was characterised by the presence of a pyramid of structures and related processes through which EU business was channelled. The structures mattered for the way in which EU affairs was dealt with.  The degree of institutionalisation can be plotted along a continuum from highly institutionalised to weakly institutionalised. The three existing member states represent a continuum from highly institutionalised (Finland), to weakly institutionalised (Greece) with Ireland at a mid-point between the two. The Irish system was characterised by a shift towards deeper institutionalisation. The pattern for the three candidate states was less evident given the accession process. Slovenia is attempting to approach the Finnish level of institutionalisation. Its system has institutionalised vertical and horizontal processes to channel European issues in the domestic system. Estonia also has well-established processes but given Estonia’s size, they are less comprehensive then the Slovene ones. The Estonian system is not unlike the Irish system prior to the Nice referendum in 2001.  In Hungary, EU expertise is centralised in the Foreign Ministry’s EIS. 

A second key variable that emerges from the analysis was the relationship between formal structures and processes and the informal within the national policy style. As would be expected in states with small administrations, informal contact between the EU cadre was evident in all six states. A relatively small number of political office holders and civil servants were the key players in relation to Europe. The cadre has shared expectations and norms and are aware of the limits of their power in the EU system.  However, the relationship between the formal processes/structures and the informal differed. In states where there was a high degree of institutionalisation, the informal was subordinate to the formal processes, whereas in systems that were weakly institutionalised, the informal was more important for policy outcomes than the formal structures. Greece was the outlier in the project. Informal links and political channels were the key to understanding the ‘living system’. In response to administrative problems or blockages, the solution in Greece was to appoint a person to tackle the problem rather than address administrative blockages and deficits. Agents were more important than structure and informal channels more important than the formal. Individuals were also important in the three candidate states given the nature of the challenge presented by the EU and the need to amass a sufficient number of civil servants with EU knowledge. 

Although variation across the three states in the study can be mapped on the basis of these variables, the degree of institutionalisation, the relationship between the formal and informal and the co-ordination ambition are deeply rooted in national styles. Ireland’s adaptive system, that responds on an incremental basis to changes in Europe, is based on a cohesive civil service, collective responsibility and a policy system dominated by the executive. This allowed a small number of key officials and political office holders to manage Ireland’s relations with Europe. The failure of the Nice referendum in 2001 was a shock to this executive dominated system. Individual politicians and political appointees who are drawn into the system to alleviate administrative weaknesses dominate the Greek system, a system characterised by centralisation and inter-ministerial rivalry. Issues are pushed up the hierarchy from the administrative to the political level because the desk official in many cases does not have the competence or authority to manage the dossier.   Finland’s deliberative, transparent and well-organised system for managing Europe is rooted in a strong state and a polity that accords a key role to parliament and partnership with interest 

The three case studies enabled us to track adaptation pressures and change over time. Engagement with the EU started at different times for Ireland, Greece and Finland. Ireland and Greece began to engage with the EU in the late 1950s and Finland in the 1990s. Historical institutionalist accounts of institutional change point to the ‘stickiness’ of institutions once established and the significance of path dependence in institutional development (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, 696-703).  Notwithstanding institutional stickiness, institutional adaptation is endemic in political life. Cortell and Peterson distinguish between incremental change and episodic change (Cortell and Peterson 1999, 182).  Episodic change may be related to what Collier and Collier term a critical juncture described as a ‘a period of significant change….which is hypothesised to produce distinct legacies’ (Collier and Collier, 1991, 29). There is considerable evidence in the study of path dependency especially in terms of the core political and administrative features of the three member states. Engagement with the EU posed continuous albeit relatively low to moderate pressures for adaptation in national core executives. There were incremental changes in terms of administrative processes and capacities in response to developments in integration. Both Ireland and Greece, however, experienced a critical juncture in relations with Brussels. Step changes in the dynamic of integration or domestic political shocks may trigger a response from the national level. 

The formative period leading up to membership was important for all states as this was the period when they experienced their first engagement with the EU. However, it was evident in Ireland and Greece, the two longest-standing members of the Union in the study, that insufficient attention was paid in these countries to preparing the domestic administrations for membership in the period leading up to accession. The main concern during the pre-membership phase was the accession negotiations and the terms of membership with little political and administrative energy left over for preparing to live with EU membership. There was an excessive focus on attaining membership and insufficient attention to the demands of membership. Finland, on the other hand, was ready for membership. The different experiences of Ireland and Greece, on the one hand, and Finland on the other, highlights the socio-economic cleavage in the Union. Both Ireland and Greece were relatively poor states when they joined as are the new member states of the Union

Pressures for the development of capacity for management of EU affairs emanated from three sources, one exogenous and two endogenous (See Table 4):

	Policy and regime change in the Union;
	Systemic change at national level;
	Political events at national level;

Of the three member states, Ireland and Greece experienced a critical juncture in their relations with the Union since membership. The Irish critical juncture was caused by the rejection of the Nice Treaty in June 2001. This was a major shock to the Government and the peak civil society organisations that had advocated a ‘yes’. The period leading up to the re-running of the Nice referendum in October 2002 was characterised by increased attention to the management of EU affairs in the core executive and in the national parliament. The system of interdepartmental committees was formalised and the committees met with greater frequency and regularity. The system of executive-parliament relations was completely transformed.  The critical juncture for Greece came in the 1990s when it appeared as if Greece would not be in a position to join the Euro. The arrival in power of Prime Minister, Simitis altered Greece’s relationship with the Union. He was determined to modernise Greece and to prepare it for eventual membership of the Euro. Although Greece was deemed not to have met the Euro convergence criteria in 1997, it was a full member by the time the single currency came into circulation in January 2002. A high level committee of outside academic experts played a very important role in ensuring that Greece met the criteria for Euro membership. Change in Finland arose from internal constitutional change that was characterised by the gradual parliamentarisation of the Finnish system with the changing balance between presidential and prime ministerial power. The enhancement of the role of the Prime Minister’s Office in EU affairs in 2002 was part of a wider systematic change. 

Table 4: Sources of change in the three states

State	Endogenous Change	Exogenous Change
Ireland	Nice ‘No’ 2001	Resurgence of Integration 1988 onwards






There is very little research that provides empirical evidence of how states perform in EU bargaining. Brussels insiders continuously make judgements about the efficacy of this system or that system, about the negotiating capacity of this or that state or the performance of this or that presidency. A study conducted between 1999 and 2001 build up a data set on decision making in the European Union that sheds light on bargaining success in the EU (European Union Politics, Special Issue, 5:1, 2004). Indicators were established for the relative power of each member state in EU 15, their perceived skill in EU bargaining and the information they have available. These indicators and then tested against the bargaining success achieved by the member state in a large number of cross sectoral negotiations (Bailer, 2004, 99-122). This data sheds interesting light on the three states analysed here. See Table 5.

Table 5: Bargaining Success in the EU





Source: Bailer, 2004, 99-122. 
















1.	This six country study, Organising for Enlargement, was financed under the EU’s Fifth Framework Research Programme. The financial support of the Commission is acknowledged and appreciated. The study was coordinated by the Dublin European Institute, University College Dublin, and involved a research team in each state. I would like to thank Johan Olsen and Simon Bulmer for their helpful comments on an earlier comparative paper that included three new member states as well. The project web site with relevant papers is at http://www.oeue.net/ (​http:​/​​/​www.oeue.net​/​​) .
2.	It is not intended in this article to engage in a comprehensive discussion of the literature on Europeanisation. It is very diffuse literature and research agenda that attempts to address how Europe hits home in terms of national politics, policies and polities. For treatments of the topic see Börzel T.A. and Risse T. (2000) Cowles M. G., Aaporaso J. and Risse T. (2001), Knill C. and Lehmkuhl D. (1999) Knill C. (2001), Olsen J. (2002) and Radelli (2000). During the 1990s there was an explosion of literature on Europeanisation. An internet search by Demmke (2002) threw up over 10,000 hits. This study presented in this special issue addresses a limited subset of the Europeanisation research agenda with its focus on the impact of the Union on executive government. 
3.	The four other faces of Europeanisation were; Europeanisation as a change in external territorial boundaries, Europeanisation as the development of institutions of governance at an EU level, Europeanisation as exporting forms of political organisation and governance beyond the European territory and Europeanisation as a political project (Olsen, 2002).
4.	The studies on executive adaptation to EU membership adopt an institutionalist perspective. Traditionally these studies consisted of empirically driven thick descriptions of formal governmental structures. In the 1990s the impact of the new institutionalism was felt with a growing number of studies adopting a historical institutionalist perspective.
5.	The Hanf and Soetendorp (1998) volume is the only volume that analyses the adaption of small states. The selection of the six cases with a mixture of existing member states that joined at different times and new member states enabled us to track change over time and to analyse the demands of the EU on national core executives. The body of EC law and the policy processes of the Union have intensified since the mid-1980s. Thus managing Europe is a changing process for national core executives. 
6.	The Bulmer and Burch analysis distinguishes between (a)formal institutional structures, (b) processes and procedures, (c) codes and guidelines and (d) a cultural dimension (Bulmer and Burch 1998, 604). The analytical categories were changed and later work to include (a) the systemic level, (b) the organisational level, (c) the regulative level and (d) the procedural level ( Bulmer and Burch, 2001, 72)
7.	In the existing member states, France, the UK and Finland are the only three states that located the key coordinating unit either in the PM’s office or as a separate agency responsible to it. In contrast, most of the candidate states opted to locate their coordinating unit under the auspices of the PM.
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